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Introduction
It is well known that national price levels exhibit significant positive association with levels of real per capita income. The positive effect of income on price is known as the Penn effect (Samuelson, 1994) , coined after a series of pioneering studies by the Penn scholars to document the effect by constructing internationally comparable data (Kravis, Heston and Summers, 1978; Kravis and Lipsey, 1983 , 1987 , 1988 and Summers and Heston, 1991) . Corroborated by a plethora of subsequent studies (Bergin, Glick and Taylor, 2006; Deaton and Heston, 2010; Ravallion, 2010; Rogoff, 1996) , the Penn effect has become conventional wisdom in international economics (Bergin 2009 ). According to Samuelson (1994) , it is "a fundamental economics fact". The implication of the effect is profound for understanding how prices relate to each other across countries. By revealing that absolute purchasing power parity (PPP) fails systematically in association with real income levels, the Penn effect provides an important clue regarding how the PPP theory needs to be modified in order to bear empirical relevance.
The current study, however, argues that the price-income relationship across countries is more complex than commonly portrayed. We show that the positive price-income relationship estimated with cross-sectional data lumping developed and developing countries together can be misleading. Our empirical results reveal not only that developed and developing countries differ in terms of magnitude and significance of the Penn effect, but also that they exhibit positive price-income relationship for different reasons. The conventional cross-country estimates mix these heterogeneous effects, failing to inform us on the essential aspects of the relationship between price and income levels across diverse countries.
The essence of the problem is succinctly put by Rogoff (1996) in examining how prices and income are related to each other across 100 countries in the 1990 data:
"… whereas the relationship between income and prices is quite striking over the full data set, it is far less impressive when one looks either at rich (industrialized) countries as a group, or at developing countries as a group." (Rogoff 1996, p.660) In the current study, we reconsider the cross-country price-income relationship by focusing on heterogeneity between the inter-developed-country and inter-developing-country income effects on prices. Using the data on some 180 countries for 1980-2010, we estimate the cross-country price-income relationship while allowing for heterogeneity between the inter-developed-country and inter-developing-country effects. To explore sources of the documented heterogeneity, we examine relevance of the sectoral productivity differential effect à la Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) .
Our main findings are summarized as follows. While the positive price-income relationship is commonly portrayed as a robust phenomenon across a large number of countries, until the mid-1990s it is driven almost entirely by the inter-developed-country effect. Across developing countries, the effect of income on price is initially nil. In the first half of the 1990s, however, the inter-developing-country effect turns significantly positive and its magnitude grows substantially in the subsequent years.
Nonetheless, this transformation does not attain homogeneity of the priceincome relationship between the developed and developing country groups. Specifically, we find that the magnitude of the inter-developed-country income effect on prices is far greater than that of the inter-developing-country effect.
More importantly, our results suggest that the developed and developing countries exhibit the positive price-income relationship for different reasons.
Specifically, we find that the inter-developed-country income effect on price is attributable, at least partly, to the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S henceforth) effect. The inter-developing-country effect, however, is found clearly inconsistent with the B-S effect. The results are robust to controlling for the effects of a variety of real and financial variables including the output share of service, trade openness, government spending, exchange rate regimes, capital account openness, and natural resource abundance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the linkages between relative price, income, and sectoral productivity. Section 3 describes the data and presents the year-by-year Penn effect estimates for the full and stratified samples. In section 4, we test if the observed price-income association can be attributed to the B-S productivity differential effect. Section 5 implements panel estimations while incorporating various control variables for robustness. In section 6, we explore sources of the difference between the inter-developed-country and inter-developing-country price-income relationships. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided in section 7.
Price, income, and sectoral productivity
The Penn effect refers to the empirical positive effect of real per capita income on general prices. To understand why the effect arises, one needs a theory. To this end, the most eminent is the B-S theory that highlights the implications of international differences in relative sectoral productivities. 1 To see how the B-S theory and the Penn effect are related to each other, we consider below a simplified version of the B-S model consisting of two countries, each producing traded and non-traded goods competitively using labor as input.
The logged relative price of the two countries is expressed
for which  is the share of non-traded goods, N p and T p denote respectively the non-traded and traded goods prices, and * indicates that the variables are of the reference country. Time subscripts are omitted for notational brevity.
In the standard B-S model, the following three key assumptions are made: competitive prices; inter-sectoral labor mobility within each country; and the law of one price (LOP) for traded goods.
With (*) w and (*) a respectively denoting wage and labor productivity in logs in the non-traded goods sector, competitive prices assure
Since labor is mobile between sectors, w is equalized between the two sectors within each country so that
From (2) and (3) we obtain
Equation (4) is a streamlined version of the key proposition of the B-S theory that the relative price of non-traded goods (to traded goods) is higher in a country with a higher relative productivity in the traded goods sector (over the non-traded goods sector). We emphasize that the B-S theory relates international difference in the relative prices of non-traded to traded goods, rather than the general price levels, to that in relative sectoral productivities.
In the price-income (i.e. the Penn effect) regression, the left-hand-side variable is cross-country difference in general price levels, rather than those in relative non-traded goods prices. The gap can be filled by the LOP assumption in the traded goods sector. Specifically, from (1), (4), and assuming
As comparison of (4) and (5) indicates, under the key assumptions made above, the cross-country difference in general price levels are accounted for by the same relative sectoral productivity differentials that determine cross-country difference in relative non-traded goods prices.
To relate price differentials to income differentials, an oft-used auxiliary assumption is that international productivity difference in the non-traded goods sector is less substantial than those in the traded goods sector. A convention is to assume non-traded goods to be traditional services such as haircut, while traded goods to be skill-intensive manufactures. 2 We note, however, neither (4) nor (5) require that a country with a greater productivity advantage in the traded goods sector over the non-traded goods sector has a higher income level. Neither do they necessitate international productivity difference in the non-traded goods sector to be smaller than that in the traded goods sector. A higher income in one country than other can be attained via a higher productivity in either of the two sectors, or both. If a country has productivity advantage over other in both sectors in an equal proportion, (5) suggests that their price levels are the same although their income levels differ. Similarly, if productivity advantage of rich countries over poor ones is more substantial in the non-traded goods sector than in the traded goods sector, prices and income should be negatively associated with each other.
What is crucial in relating the Penn effect to the B-S effect is the correspondence between tradability and productivity of the sectors. For the B-S effect (i.e. the sectoral productivity differentials effect) to be a driver of the Penn effect (i.e. the positive income effect), it has to be the case that the sector whose products are highly traded is the sector that has substantial international productivity difference. The validity of this proposition turns out to be rather different between the inter-developed-country and inter-developing-country cases, as will be seen below.
3.
The Penn effect estimates
Data and canonical estimates
The data we use come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) Database. Our dataset spans the maximum of 182 countries for the period of 1980-2010. Due to missing observations, the effective number of countries varies by
year. 3 See the data appendix for further details.
As a preliminary investigation, we estimate the canonical cross-country Penn effect regression equation
for which i p and i y are country i's general price level and per capita GDP for a given year, respectively. 4 Both variables are measured in logged relative terms to the US, the reference country denoted by * in the previous section. For the rest of the paper, variables are gauged in relative terms to the US observations unless otherwise noted.
In estimating (6) by pooling observations across all countries, we implicitly assume as many preceding studies that the price-income relationship is homogeneous regardless of whether it is considered within a group of developed countries, within a group of developing countries, or between developed and developing countries. The entries summarize the estimation results of (6). **, * and † indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The results in panel A are based on the data on the maximum sample available in each year. Those in panel B are obtained by using the data on the same 115 countries for all years. N denotes the number of observations. indicate that the magnitude of the effect is more than doubled in a quarter century. The 2010 estimates suggest, however, a declining symptom in the most recent period. A thorough time profile of the coefficient estimates is drawn in Figure 1 with the 95 % confidence intervals. As the figure depicts, a significant shift in the Penn effect occurs from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. The chief driver of this shift turns out to be altering behavior of developing countries, as we will see in the next subsection. To highlight the problem of the convetional estimates, we repeat Rogoff's exercise using our 1990 data to provide a regression scatter plot as Figure 2 -A. 5 A striking feature of the plot is that the high-income OECD countries, denoted by shaded 5 Rogoff (1996) presents a regression scatter plot using the Penn World squares, uniformly deviate far upward from the regression line. In fact, Greece and Portugal aside, they are virtually outliers as a group. We also provide a plot for the 2005 data as Figure 2 -B to indicate the persisting symptom of the problem. While there is a general tendency that very rich countries have higher prices than very poor ones, defining it as a linear homogenous relationship across countries over a wide income range is problematic. This is, of course, a reiteration of Rogoff (1996) .
In view of Figure 2 -B, we also notice in the high income range a non-negligible number of countries that have unambiguously lower prices than the OECD countries.
That is, at the higher income end, countries diverge in their prices into two distinct groups. The canonical price-income regression line lies in-between to reflect the behavior of neither group. We will elaborate on the point later in section 6. 
Inter-developed-country and inter-developing-country effects
Upon the advent of comprehensive international data sets such as the WDI and the Penn Word Table, it has become a popular practice to pool observations on a vast number of countries, including both developed and developing ones, in estimating the cross-country price-income relationship. 6 Nevertheless, it should be recalled that in the seminal study Balassa (1964) considers the relationship within solely industrially developed countries. Furthermore, Balassa (1973 Balassa ( , 1974 explicitly warns against 6 The practice is quite common. See for instance Bergin et al. (2006) , Frankel (2006) , and Rogoff (1996) among many others. Consequently, the price-income relationship may also differ substantially. 9 In this regard, what we find in the previous sub-section and what Rogoff (1996) finds are outcomes of the extrapolation Balassa repudiated decades earlier.
Of course, it is questionable if Balassa's argument remains as pertinent for developing countries in the 1990s and 2000s as it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Over the past decades many developing countries pursued market-liberalizing policies to participate in the global economy. In many countries, tariffs and other trade restrictions have been reduced, and their boosted growth potentials attract much international capital flow. In short, the world economic landscape has changed substantially.
The above discussion and the preliminary results in the previous sub-section motivate us to estimate the price-income relationship while allowing for heterogeneity between the developed and developing country groups. Specifically, we estimate Balassa (1974, p.881) states "...I carefully refrained from extrapolating the relationships observed among developed countries to developed-developing country relationships....". 8 Edwards and Savastano (1999) provides a survey of studies on the B-S effect for developing countries. See also Choudhri and Khan (2005) . 9 Some precursory evidence is reported by Kravis and Lipsey (1988) , Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2007) , and Fujii (2011) .
for which i D is an indicator variable which takes a value of unity when economy i is a developed country, and is set equal to zero otherwise.
We adopt the WDI's classification scheme to define the developed countries to be the high-income OECD countries. There are several countries joined the OECD during the sample period to eventually become the high-income OECD countries.
These countries are treated as developed countries only for the years they fully hold their OECD memberships. 10
It is important to emphasize that the effect of being an industrially developed country is different from the effect of merely having a high level of income. For instance, oil-producing countries tend to have high income levels. Their economic structures are, however, rather distinctive due to heavy reliance on oil production, which is a focal point Balassa (1973 Balassa ( , 1974 notes in arguing against the developed-developing extrapolation of the price-income relationship. Therefore, they are not included in the developed countries even though some have even higher income levels than the US'.
We note that (6) is a constrained version of (7) upon which 2 1    and 2 1    are imposed. The intercept equality constraint requires a developed country and a developing country to have an identical price level if they both were to have the same income level as the US. The slope equality constraint requires the marginal effect of income on price to be identical for the developed and developing countries. We test the validity of these constraints, rather than imposing them as in many extant studies.
The estimation results, summarized by Table 2 , are remarkable in a few ways.
First, for the developed countries, the Penn effect estimates appear far greater in magnitude than the full-sample estimates reported in Table 1 . Second, the developing (7) in the main text. **, * and † indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The 2  statistics for slope equality and intercept equality are calculated under the null hypotheses of 2 1    and 2 1    , respectively. N denotes the total number of observations which is the sum of n's of the two sub-samples. 
4.
Is it the Balassa-Samuelson effect?
Sectoral productivity and tradability
To account for the heterogeneity in the Penn effect estimates, it is worth relating (6) to the B-S effect as (5). From the B-S perspective, the results in section 3 may be interpreted that, for the developed countries as a group, we find the significant Penn effect presumably because their income differential is driven chiefly by the productivity differential in the traded goods sector. For the developing countries on the other hand, the cross-country productivity differential is not biased for the traded goods sector until the early-1990s, resulting in the initial absence of the Penn effect.
Subsequently, however, the productivity differential becomes increasingly biased for the traded goods sector so that the Penn effect emerges to manifest the B-S effect.
To test the conjecture above, it is necessary to gauge productivity by sector.
Due to paucity of data on sectoral productivity, we construct proxy measures by following Hsieh (1982) , Marston (1987) , and Canzzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1999) to adopt the average product of labor approach. 11 It is well known that for the Cobb-Douglas type production function, a competitive equilibrium sets the marginal product of labor to be proportional to the average product of labor in each sector. Canzzoneri et al. (1999) further shows for a wider variety of production technologies that the proportionality property holds in equilibrium if both labor and capital are mobile between sectors. 12 Assuming the inter-sectoral factor mobility, we construct our sectoral productivity measures below.
The WDI contains value added and employment data for three sectorsagriculture, industry and service. 13 From these data, we construct the following measure of sectoral labor productivity 11 Alternatively, total factor productivity (TFP) is used by, for instance, De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994) , Chinn (2000) , and Kakkar (2003) that consider smaller sets of countries. The TFP approach requires data on sectoral capital stock and labor shares that are not available for a large number of countries in our sample. 12 Specifically, suppose that an economy consists of the non-traded and traded goods sectors competitively producing respective goods using capital and labor. If both factors are mobile between sectors, indicates the number of employees and is obtained by
for which j i,  is the employment in sector j as a percentage of total employment, i  is the ratio of employment to population, and i H is the population of country i. For all variables, time subscripts are suppressed for brevity.
An essential feature of the B-S model is that sectors are dichotomized into either of traded or non-traded goods. In reality, however, most if not all products contain some non-traded components. Acknowledging difficulty of precisely quantifying the extent of product tradability, we make general inferences from available data regarding tradability of agriculture, industry and service products as follows. 14 The WDI report data on value added per worker for agriculture, but not for industry or service. For consistency, we use (8) for all three sectors. 15 The WDI reports the sectoral trade share only for service. While the remainder is the share of agriculture and industry trade, the breakdown between the two sectors is not available. For this reason, we compare the sum of agriculture and industry to service. Notes: Figure A shows the ratio of total trade to value added by sector for the developed and developing countries separately. Figure B exhibits Agriculture and industry
Service
Overall, it is reasonable to consider that agricultural and industrial products are generally much more traded than services. Therefore, we use agriculture and industry as a proxy for the traded goods sector whereas service for the non-traded goods sector.
4.2
Estimating the sectoral productivity differential effect
Using the sectoral productivity variables defined above, we first estimate as a benchmark specification
where subscript T (N) indicates the traded (non-traded) sector approximated by agriculture and industry (service), and all are in relative terms to the US. 16 Unfortunately, missing observations are prevalent for the variables required to construct the productivity proxy measures. In particular, data on the ratio of employment to population are available only from 1991. Also, the end period is set to 2008 since the US data are available (in the current data set) only through that year. Consequently, the effective number of countries is reduced and the sample period is shortened. Table 3 presents the results in three-year intervals. By imposing homogeneity between the developed and developing country groups, (10) fails to attain significance of the productivity differential effect estimates. To confirm that the insignificance is not an artifact of the shrunk sample size, we re-estimate (6) using the identical country samples to report the results in Panel B. As shown, the income effect on price is significantly positive across years as before. In addition, comparison of the adjusted R 2 indicates that (10) fits the data rather poorly. 16 For T i a , , we use a weighted average of j i a , s for agriculture and for industry. The weights are determined by their relative shares in the total value added. The entries in Panel A summarize the estimation results of (10). The entries in Panel B are the estimates of (6) for the same sample countries as in the Panel A. **, * and † indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. The entries summarize the estimation results of (11). **, * and † indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The 2  statistics for slope equality and intercept equality are calculated under the null hypotheses of 2 1    and 2 1    , respectively. N denotes the total number of observations which is the sum of n's of the two sub-samples. To allow the sectoral productivity differential effect to vary between the inter-developed-country and inter-developing-country cases, we next estimate
Panel A of
The results are reported in Table 4 . Also, the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence bounds are drawn in Figure 5 . The results reveal striking difference in the sectoral productivity differential effects between the two country groups. For the developed countries, the effect of the productivity differentials is always positive, and it is often significant to be consistent with the B-S theory. On the contrary, the effect for the developing country group is mostly negative though generally insignificant. The results suggest that the B-S effect is relevant only to the inter-developed-country price differential, and not to the inter-developing-country one.
While we find in section 3.2 that both the developed and developing countries exhibit significant Penn effect since the mid-1990s, the results in this section suggest that only the inter-developed-country Penn effect can be regarded a manifestation of the B-S effect. We next examine if the conclusion survives more elaborated estimations.
Panel estimates and extended specifications

Panel estimates
The year-by-year estimates thus far allow us to study the time evolution of the effects at the cost of limiting the degrees of freedom in each estimate. Given the limited data availability, the cost can be potentially large by making it difficult to detect significant effects when present. The problem becomes exacerbated when incorporating a number of control variables as will be done in the next sub-section.
To alleviate the potential problem, we implement a panel estimation of (11) by pooling observations across years to boost the test power 17
The panel specification constrains the coefficients on the productivity differential terms, 1  and 2  , to be constant across years. According to our findings in the previous sections, the price-income relationships appear relatively stable since the mid-1990s. By taking into account also the data availability of the control variables to incorporate in the next sub-section, we estimate (12) using the 1996-2004 data so that the results in this and next sub-sections can be directly compared.
The estimates of (12) are summarized in column 1 of Table 5 . Via the panel approach, the sectoral productivity differential effect turns out to be significant for both the developed and developing country groups but with opposite signs. That is, the sectoral productivity differential effect is significantly positive for the developed countries, but it is significantly negative for the developing countries. The perverse effect implies that among the developing countries, ones with more substantial productivity advantage in the service sector tend to have higher price levels. The negative effect by itself does not necessarily refute the B-S effect among the developing countries. From our discussion in section 2, however, we note that in order to reconcile the negative productivity effect with the B-S theory, price and income levels need to be negatively related to each other across the developing countries. This is clearly not the case as the result in section 3.2 (Figure 3-B) confirms the presence of the significantly positive inter-developing-country Penn effect over the corresponding sample period. (12) and its extended specifications using the 1996-2004 data. **, * and † indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Extended specifications with controls
In revisiting Figure 2 , we notice that for a given level of income, prices tend to be more widely dispersed among the developing countries than the developed countries.
This implies that factors other than income exert more substantial influences on prices of the developing countries. It is thus worth examining if incorporating relevant control variables significantly alters the findings in the previous sub-section.
As factors to distinguish developing countries from developed ones in the price-income relationship, Balassa (1973 Balassa ( , 1974 refers to relative importance of non-traded goods sectors, openness for trade, extents of capital flow, and natural resource abundance. Some of these factors are found empirically important (Clague, 1986; Kravis and Lipsey, 1987) . More recently, Broda (2006) finds for developing countries that nominal exchange rate regimes significantly affect price levels. Drawing upon these and other studies, we consider the following variables as controls -the share of service sector in GDP, trade openness, government spending relative to GDP, exchange rate regimes, capital account openness, and population density. We discuss each briefly below.
The output share of the non-traded sector is an indicator of structural difference of economies. It can be shaped by various factors including factor endowments and trade policy. An inflationary effect of a rising service share is reported by, for instance, Clague (1986) and Lipsey (1983, 1987) . Further, the recent literature on international trade (Melitz, 2003) shows that productivity gains of firms determine endogenously the non-traded share. Bergin et al. (2006) numerically simulates the dynamic interaction between productivity shocks and tradability to report that rise in the non-traded share amplifies the B-S effect. In the current analysis, we use the value added share of service as a proxy while expecting a positive coefficient.
Trade openness, gauged by the ratio of foreign trade to national output, reflects the degree to which forces of international trade drive the traded goods prices toward uniformity across countries. The sign of the trade openness effect depends on the level of income (Kravis and Lipsey, 1987) . By pulling a country's price level towards the world average, a higher propensity to trade is expected to exert a negative (positive) effect on price for countries with higher (lower) income.
While the B-S theory focuses solely on the supply-side, empirically demand-side factors may also matter to prices. In particular, a demand shift between traded goods and non-traded goods can alter their relative prices. Froot and Rogoff (1991) studies the implications of a disproportionate fall of the government spending on non-traded goods for European economies. Similarly, De Gregorio et al. (1994) reports empirical evidence that real government expenditure over GDP exerts a significant positive effect on price levels of OECD countries. We thus include the variable as a potential demand shifter toward the non-traded goods.
A country can have a higher price level than other with an identical income level by having a more inflation-receptive financial system. For instance, Broda (2006) reports that the price levels of developing countries with fixed exchange rate regimes are twenty percent higher than those with flexible regimes. To capture the effect, we incorporate the de facto exchange rate regime classification developed by Sturzenegger (2003, 2005) . 18 Specifically, we adopt their three-way classifications to introduce intermediate regime and fixed regime dummies to capture their price effects relative to a flexible regime. 19 Due to limited availability of the data, adopting the variables constrains the sample period to end in 2004.
Additionally we gauge the extent of general capital account openness by using the index due to Chinn and Ito (2006) . The index summarizes the information on the existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account and capital account transactions, and requirement to surrender of export proceeds. A higher value of the index indicates a more open capital account which tends to accommodate a higher price level according to Broda (2006) .
Finally, we include population density for the following reasons. While natural resource abundance is considered an important price determinant of developing countries (Balassa, 1973; Clague and Tanzi, 1972) , it is hard to directly gauge the abundance of diverse natural resources across countries. In a large sample of countries, however, land area per head (i.e. inverse of population density) is expected to be correlated with availability of mineral and other natural resource endowments (Keesing and Sherk, 1971) . Further, population density tends to reflect availability of good soils, water supply, and trade access (Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999) . The variable allows also an intuitive interpretation that, as an indicator of relative scarcity of land, rise in population density puts an upward pressure on prices of non-traded goods such as housing and office rent. Thus, holding all else equal, a more densely populated country is conjectured to have a higher price level.
Sturzenegger apply cluster analysis using three classification variables -volatility of nominal exchange rates, volatility of their rates of changes, and volatility of international reserves. See Sturzenegger (2003, 2005) for details. 19 Intermediate regimes include dirty float and crawling peg regimes. Inconclusive cases are dropped from the sample.
We extend (12) by adding the above-introduced variables as controls. Some variant specifications are estimated to examine if incorporating the controls significantly alters the productivity differential effect estimates. Columns 2 to 4 of Table 5 present the results. The chief findings are summarized as follows.
The effects of the control variables are found generally significant with expected signs. For both the inter-developed-country and inter-developing-country estimates, a higher service share, a rigid exchange rate regime, and a higher population density tend to lead to a higher price level. 20 The effect of trade openness depends on income level as conjectured. While it is significantly negative for the developed countries, the sign is reversed for the developing countries. 21 While a higher government spending share lifts prices solely of the developing countries, the inflationary effect of a more open capital account appears significant only for the developed countries.
More importantly, we find crucial difference in the robustness of the sectoral productivity differential effects between the developed and developing country estimates. Specifically, while the positive productivity differential effect among the developed countries is quite robust to addition of the controls, the negative effect for the developing countries gets washed away. That is, the sectoral productivity differential is not a significant determinant of the inter-developing-country price differential once other relevant effects are controlled for. 20 The fixed exchange rate regime dummy yields a significantly positive coefficient estimate for both the developed and developing countries. That is, countries adopting a fixed regime tend to have higher prices than those with a flexible regime, holding all others constant. The effect of an intermediate regime is also significantly positive for the developed countries. For the developing countries, however, the results suggest that adopting an intermediate regime is no more inflationary than a flexible regime. 21 Once the income level is controlled for, the trade openness has price reducing effect for both country groups as presented in column 5.
Column 5 of Table 5 contains the additional estimates when simultaneously including the productivity differential and income variables with all the controls. Both variables have a significant positive effect on prices of the developed countries, suggesting that the B-S effect is important but only part of the inter-developed-country Penn effect. For the developing countries, the effect of income is significantly positive in the presence of the other controls while that of the productivity differential is not.
Thus, the inter-developing-country price-income association, while significantly positive, cannot be attributed to the B-S effect.
In sum, the results in this section suggest that sectoral productivity differential has rather different implications for the developed and developing countries.
Specifically, the price-income relationship across the developed countries is consistent with the B-S assertion, and at least part of their Penn effect is regarded a manifestation of the B-S effect. In contrast, the inter-developing-country Penn effect cannot be reconciled with the B-S effect, and hence, it must be driven by other forces.
Exploring sources of the difference
Recall that in section 3.1 we observe diverging price trends at the higher end of the income range in Figure 2 -B. Further in section 3.2, we emphasize that the effect of being an industrially developed economy is different from the effect of merely having a high income level. To elaborate on these points, we examine how the results change if we stratify the countries solely by income level. Specifically, we define the higher-income countries to be ones whose per capita income equals or exceeds the minimum of the high-income OECD countries'. That is, the higher-income countries include all the developed countries and the developing countries with the matching 22 Using this definition, we repeat our exercises while allowing separate coefficient estimates for the higher-income countries and the remaining countries.
Classifying the countries solely by the income threshold leads to crucially different results. Specifically, the panel estimation results summarized in Table 6 indicate that the productivity differential effect is insignificant for the higher-income countries irrespective of inclusion of the control variables. The effect for the remaining countries is perversely signed and generally insignificant. In other words, the B-S effect loses its relevance once we group countries solely by income level.
What is behind the apparent difference between the development-based and income-based stratified-sample estimates? As the source of the difference, we focus on the behavior of the higher-income developing countries. Table 7 compares the higher-income developing countries to the developed countries by their correlation matrices of the focal variables. A few observations are in order. First, in contrast to the high correlations between the price and productivity variables exhibited by the developed countries, the corresponding correlations for the higher-income developing countries are rather low. Particularly the correlation between price and traded-goods sector productivity is only .14 as compared to .85 of the developed countries'. Second, the traded-goods sector productivity also shows a weaker correlation with the income level among the higher-income developing countries than the developed countries. Importantly, for the higher-income developing countries, income is more strongly correlated with the non-traded goods sector productivity than the traded-goods sector productivity. This makes a contrast to the developed countries whose income shows a higher correlation with the traded-goods sector productivity.
Third, the productivity variables are highly correlated between the two sectors for the developed countries, but not for the higher-income developing countries.
The first and second observations above imply that the behavior of the higher-income developing countries crucially deviate from the assertion of the B-S theory. Both price and income differentials among the high-income developing countries tend to move together more with the productivity difference in the non-traded goods sector than that in the traded-goods sector. This, combined with the third observation above, helps explain why we obtain negative coefficient estimates on the sectoral productivity differential variable for the developing country group in section 5.
Recall from our discussion in section 2 that, in order to attribute the Penn effect to the B-S effect, the sector whose products are highly traded needs to be the sector that has substantial international productivity difference. This sectoral correspondence between tradability and productivity, while satisfied by the developed countries, is violated by the developing countries.
According to the third observation noted above, the developed countries with a higher productivity in the traded goods sector tends to have also a higher productivity in the non-traded goods sector. While this may be due partly to the fact that the service sector is partially traded rather than non-traded, it may also be an indication that the B-S theory awaits a refinement when the information and skill-intensive modern service sector grows to play an increasingly important role in generating national income.
Conclusion
Conventional wisdom in international macroeconomics is that price and income levels are positively associated with each other across countries. While the positive effect of income on price is widely documented, a closer view of the data casts doubt on reliability of the canonical cross-country regression to reflect the genuine relationship, as succinctly put by Rogoff (1996) . The issue, despite its importance, has long been neglected in the literature. To fill in the crucial gap, we provide a closer view of the cross-country price-income relationship while focusing on significant heterogeneity between the inter-developed-country and inter-developing country effects.
Our main findings are summarized as follows. While the conventional cross-country regression obtains significant Penn effect estimates, the magnitude of the estimates increases substantially from the late 1980s to the early 1990s as the inter-developing-country effect turns from nil to significantly positive. The stratified sample estimates further uncover crucial heterogeneity in the price-income relationship between the developed and developing country groups, not only in terms of magnitude of the Penn effect but also in terms of their sources. That is, the developed and developing countries exhibit the positive price-income relationship for different reasons.
More specifically, we find that the inter-developed-country relationship can be attributed, at least partly, to the B-S effect. In contrast, the newly-emerged significant but milder inter-developing-country income effect on price is clearly at odds with the B-S effect, and hence requires other explanation. The conclusion remains intact after controlling for the effects of cross-country differences in the service sector share, trade openness, government spending, exchange rate regimes, capital account openness, and population density as a proxy for natural resource abundance.
In exploring sources of the difference, we find an indication that the developed and developing countries differ in the primary sector whose international productivity differentials are associated with international price differentials. For the developed countries, a higher relative productivity in the traded goods sector is more strongly correlated with a higher price level, consistently with the assertion of the B-S theory.
On the contrary, for the developing countries with the similarly high level of income, a higher relative productivity in the service sector (i.e. largely non-tradable sector) is more strongly associated with a higher price level.
What generates the inter-developing-country positive price-income association if it does not derive from the B-S effect? One possibility is that, despite the massive efforts by the International Comparison Program (ICP), the cross-country price comparison has yet to fully net out the effect of quality difference. As Bils and Klenow (2001) shows with the US consumer expenditure survey data, as households get richer they tend to consume not only more but also better goods. This can generate positive association between price and income levels, which may also be observed (indeed more likely) in the cross-country data if product quality differences are not fully controlled for. In fact, handling of product quality differences remains one of the main challenges in international price comparisons (Deaton and Heston, 2010) . Even with the impressive progress made by the ICP over the years, the task becomes notoriously difficult as we expand the income range of countries to compare.
Testing the conjecture is rather challenging in the international context since it requires information on quality aspects of goods and services around the globe. This and other extensions are saved for future research.
